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Introduction 
The 1960s and 1970s are consensually considered the decades of the rise and diffusion of 
student movements in most of the world.1 Student activism in this period was twofold: on the one 
hand, students were concerned with problems of an internal nature, regarding campus regulations 
and dynamics; on the other hand, student movements had an active role in political 
demonstrations outside campuses, targeting governments’ policies and working side by side with 
other social movements of the time, mostly Left-wing progressive and pacifist movements.2 In 
contrast, the subsequent two decades, the 1980s and 1990s, are regarded as marking the end of 
social mobilizations and especially of youth involvement in civil society. The loss of strength by 
social movements and student movements alike in this period is often attributed to the exhaustion 
of the “confidence in the possibility of large-scale transformation from below.”3 
However, this confidence seems to have recently been reborn among students in various 
countries around the world, including Japan.4 Since December 2012, with the political comeback 
of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, Japan has been shifting its domestic policy in a more conservative 
direction, while at the same time opting for an assertive foreign policy involving a more resolute 
and proactive defense stance. 5  Notwithstanding the political victories reported by the Abe 
government on both fronts, internal opposition to the new bills has been strong and widespread, 
1 Colin Barker, “Some Reflections on Student Movements of the 1960s and Early 1970s,” Revista Crítica de Ciências 
Sociais 81, (2008): 43. 
2 Ibid. 43. 
3 Ibid. 81. 
4  See for example Alia Wong, “The Renaissance of Student Activism,” The Atlantic (21st May 2015), about the 
emergence of a new wave of student activism in the U.S.; and Jeff Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on 
Japan’s Constitution,” The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus 13, issue 36, no. 1 (7th September 2015), on Japan’s most 
recent student movement.   
5 Christopher W. Hughes, “An ‘Abe Doctrine’ as Japan’s Grand Strategy: New Dynamism or Dead-End?” The Asia-
Pacific Journal Japan Focus (21st July 2015). 
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involving not only the opposition parties, but also the LDP’s coalition partner Kōmeitō and public 
opinion.6 A wide range of protests and political activities have been held in Tokyo and in other 
major cities throughout the country against the government’s policies; among them, those 
organized by the group known as SEALDs7 have generated the greatest interest in the media and 
in the public. 
The group has also gathered attention from scholars interested in social movements in 
Japan since its outset as SASPL 8 in December 2013. SASPL began stimulating the interest of 
scholars of social movements in the first place for being the first student movement since the 
1960’s Zengakuren to address the government policies directly, focusing in particular on the State 
Secrecy Act proposed by the second Abe cabinet.9 When the bill came into force in December 
2014, the members of SASPL decided to redesign their group as a multi-focal movement, which 
took the name of SEALDs. The new configuration of the group maintained the direct focus on 
government policies, asking for respect of the Constitution and of popular opinion in matters of 
both domestic and foreign policy. Since then, SEALDs have become the first college-based social 
movement in the last fifty years to gain consistent visibility in the media and public support. 
Nevertheless, only some preliminary research notes and short articles have been produced 
so far in the academic domain,10 and SEALDs’ relevance in the wider context of civil society in 
6 Ibid. 
7 The acronym stands for “Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy.” 
8 The acronym stands for “Students Against the Secret Protection Law.” 
9 Also known as “Designated State Secrets Law” or “Special Secrets Protection Bill,” the law allows the Japanese 
government to protect as state secrets matters related to the four areas of defense, diplomacy, counterespionage 
and counterterrorism. Masahiro Usaki, “What Japan's Designated State Secrets Law Targets,” The Asia-Pacific 
Journal Japan Focus 12, issue 21, no. 1 (May 2014). 
10  For example Slater et al., “SEALDs (Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy): Research Note on 
Contemporary Youth Politics in Japan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus 13, issue 37, no. 1 (14th September 2015). 
These researchers have had the possibility to follow the evolution of SEALDs since its very beginning and to collect 
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Japan has not been fully investigated yet. Therefore, in this thesis I seek to analyze SEALDs from a 
comparative perspective, with a view to clarifying the social and cultural roots of the group, and 
its originality in the context of contemporary Japanese social movements. Such a study would shed 
light on the political implications of the activities of SEALDs and on their potentiality to affect 
policymaking and public participation in civil society in contemporary Japan. 
In the first chapter of this thesis I will investigate how the development of student 
movements since their rise in the 1960s through their resurgence in the early decades of the XXI 
century has been represented by scholars, in an attempt to historicize the academic analysis of 
student activism in Japan. Such a historical analysis is a necessary starting point to debate the 
relationship between SEALDs and their XX century forerunners. As Kristin Ross has argued, the 
social mobilizations of the 1960s “cannot now be considered separately from the social memory 
and forgetting that surround them;”11 on the contrary, the way in which a dominant interpretation 
of the events related to those mobilizations came to prevail is just as important as the events 
themselves.12 Thus, the historical analysis in the first chapter aims at exposing the predominant 
ways in which social movements in Japan have been framed from the 1970s onward, and at 
uncovering the ways in which these narratives have contributed, and still contribute, to 
delegitimizing youth’s involvement in civil society as well as to depoliticizing the events 
surrounding June 1960 and the struggle against the U.S – Japan Security Treaty (known in Japan, 
and henceforth referred to, as Anpo).  
interviews with members and non-members participants in the context of their ongoing research project on social 
movements in Japan, “Voices of Protest Japan.” 
11 Kristin Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 1. 
12 Ibid. 6. 
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The second chapter will build on the historical analysis to discuss how SEALDs relate to the 
aforementioned dominant narrative about social movements and student political activism in 
Japan. Through a comparison between SEALDs and the 1960’s Zengakuren I will show that there 
exists positive commonalities between the two movements, in spite of the image of contrast that 
has been portrayed in the press and in some academic research notes. I will also argue that despite 
these similarities, SEALDs have been pressured by the existing negative memory of student 
activism to cast an image of themselves as totally opposed to the dominant representations of the 
1960’s Zengakuren and of their activities as antithetical to those of the anti-Anpo mobilizations. In 
other words, I will use the historical investigation of the previous chapter as a starting point to 
analyze how SEALDs frame their actions, as well as how commentators interpret them, in relation 
to the legacy of their 1960s’ forerunners.  
The third chapter will address the role of SEALDs in the broader context of contemporary 
Japanese civil society. Comparing SEALDs with the Zengakuren of the 1960’s anti-Anpo protests is 
relevant to understand the influence the 1960s’ student movements still exert on student activism. 
However, a comparison with other current social movements is also significant because, instead 
of relating two movements that belong to different periods in the postwar history of Japan, it 
allows to analyze different responses to similar socio-economic and political conditions. 13  In 
particular, I will describe the relationship between SEALDs and two other contemporary instances 
of social mobilization which have influenced the founders of SEALDs in terms of methods of 
protests and ideological content of their advocacy, namely furītā movements and anti-nuclear 
13  Robin O’Day, “Differentiating SEALDs from Freeters, and Precariats: the politics of youth movements in 
contemporary Japan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus 13, issue 37, no. 2 (14th September 2015). 
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movements. Such comparison will help define the original characteristics of SEALDs and the points 
of overlap between the group and other contemporary social movements in order to determine 
SEALDs’ long-term ability to influence public participation in politics, and thus policymaking.  
Theoretical framework and methods 
This study makes use of multiple research methods and sources. To analyze the academic 
discourse surrounding student movements active in the 1960s and 1970s I will rely on secondary 
literature, produced both in the very period of activity of the movements and in the following two 
decades, in order to show how a hegemonic narrative has developed over time. I will draw upon 
Kristin Ross’s idea that the events related to the social mobilizations that happened in France in 
1968 cannot be understood without considering the way in which they have been socially 
remembered and forgotten ever since.14 Ross argued that after the social struggles that happened 
in France in 1968 a hegemonic history of the events was generated through strategies of 
“reduction;” in such a history “dominant narrative configurations” were detectable.15 The most 
relevant of these narrative devices was the de-politicization of the mobilization, or in other words 
the casting of “May ‘68” as a cultural rebellion rather than as a political event.16  
A similar narrative, deploying analogous strategies and narrative devices, dominates the 
discourse about social mobilizations in Japan since the anti-Anpo struggle of 1960. In order to 
restore the political dimension of social activism, politics have to be understood as something 
14 Kristin Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives, 1. 
15 Ibid. 8. 
16 Ibid. 13. 
7 
 
                                                            
more than only “specialized, electoral politics.”17 Therefore, politics will here be understood as all 
those practices that denaturalize and disrupt the “logic of the social,” or social order.18  
The analyses of current social movements in the second and third chapters will rely both 
on primary sources, such as newspaper articles, posts on the official social media pages of the 
movements, and their sites; and on secondary sources, such as academic articles and research 
notes. To frame this data I will draw on social movement theory and on social media theory. 
In particular, from social movement theory I will borrow the concept of “framing” as 
conceptualized in relation to social movements by Snow and Benford19 and the notion of “political 
opportunity” developed by Sidney Tarrow.20 Thus, social movements will be defined as “signifying 
agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning” for members, adversaries, 
and the public.21 Their signifying process will be referred to as “framing.” In order to be effective, 
a framing strategy should identify one or more communal struggles among its (potential) members, 
and create the perception that through collective action the problem(s) could be redressed.22 In 
this way a framing process mediates between a “political opportunity,” that is “a set of clues that 
encourage people to engage in contentious politics,”23 and the organization of collective action.24 
17 Ibid. 15. 
18  Ibid. 24. Ross takes this definition of politics from Jacques Rancière, Dis-agreement. Politics and Philosophy, 
(University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 29- 30. 
19 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” 
Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000): 611-639. 
20 Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 
1994). 
21 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements:” 613-14. 
22 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and 
framing processes- toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements,” in Comparative Perspectives 
on Social Movements, ed. Doug Mc Adam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
5. 
23 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 33. 
24 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and 
framing processes- toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements,” 8. 
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In other words, a change in institutionalized politics offers an opportunity to be used for political 
gain only by groups that organize themselves enough to construct the change as relevant to and 
influenceable by their members.  
Lastly, in the third chapter I will also draw on social media theory as I will consider how the 
use of social media by social movements has variously influenced the engagement of civil society 
in political advocacy. Civil society is here understood as “the organized non-state, non-market 
sector that exists above the family and individual;”25 and by endorsing the concept of multi-
layered social reality26 I will maintain that members of civil society are influenced in their political 
opinions and behaviors not only by their offline social networks and by mass media,27 but also by 
online interactions happening through social media.28 
The 1960’s anti- Anpo struggle from a historical perspective 
The first institutionally organized student movement in Japan was founded on September 
18th 1948, and took the name of Zen Nihon gakusei jichikai sō rengō (translated in English as “All 
Japan Federation of College Student Governments”), which is usually abridged as Zengakuren. 
Despite this late institutionalization, student political engagement could be traced back to as early 
as the foundation of higher education in Japan, and was particularly strong in the immediate pre-
25 Yūko Kawato, Robert Pekkanen, and Tsujinaka Yutaka, “Civil Society and the Triple Disasters: Revealed Strengths 
and Weaknesses,” in Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan. Response and Recovery after Japan’s 3/11, ed. Jeff 
Kingston (Nissan Institute/ Routledge Japanese Studies Series, 2012), 78. 
26 Ken’ichi Ikeda and Sean Richey, Social Networks and Japanese Democracy. The beneficial impact of interpersonal 
communication in East Asia (London; New York: Routledge, 2012), 27-34. 
27 Shanto Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political issues (The University of Chicago Press, 
1991), 2-3. 
28 David H. Slater, Keiko Nishimura and Love Kindstrand, “Social Media in Disaster Japan,” in Natural Disaster and 
Nuclear Crisis in Japan. Response and Recovery after Japan’s 3/11, ed. Jeff Kingston (Nissan institute/ Routledge 
Japanese Studies Series, 2012), 94. 
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war period.29 However, it was only after the end of the Second World War, during the Occupation 
of Japan by the Allied forces (1945-1952), that students could aggregate in a nation-wide 
movement, at first with the goal of “democratizing” campus life and university practices.30  
The way in which this student movement came into existence and developed, as well as 
the reasons behind its emergence, have been differently interpreted by its contemporary analysts. 
However, most of the images of the movement produced by academics in its period of maximum 
activity (from the late 1950s until the mid-1960s) show a common tendency toward stressing its 
internal diversity. For example, Tsurumi Kazuko analyzed how the Zengakuren divided in different 
factions between 1955 and 1958. 31  Her analysis clearly showed that a plurality of political 
positions was present inside the movement: against the anti-authoritarian, Marxist-based 
Communist League or Bund faction, which together with the Revolutionary Communist League 
faction prevailed on the others and was therefore referred to as mainstream Zengakuren, stood 
the anti-mainstream Zengakuren or Zenjiren, which stayed loyal to the Communist Party of Japan 
(CPJ), and the Structural Reformist faction, which took a more radically critical stance inspired by 
the Italian politician Palmiro Togliatti.32  
At the same time, by arguing that the students who participated in the Zengakuren’s 
struggle shared an “ideological posture” rather than a political ideology,33 Tsurumi could reveal 
the eclectic range of approaches to Marxism present inside the Zengakuren, and consequently 
29 Michiya Shimbori, “Comparison between Pre- and Post-War Student Movements in Japan,” Sociology of Education 
37, no.1 (1963): 59-60.  
30 Ibid. 61. 
31 Kazuko Tsurumi, “The Japanese Student Movement (1) its Milieu,” Japan Quarterly 15, no. 4 (October 1968): 445- 
446. 
32 Ibid. 446. 
33 Ibid. 431- 432. 
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highlight the heterogeneity of relations existing between the different Zengakuren’s factions and 
the Communist Party. 34  Other scholars have later shown how these different views on the 
theoretical level generated differences on the practical level of action, in particular with regard to 
the use of violence.35 
Furthermore, scholars in the 1960s tended to focus on the development of the movement 
over time in terms of form and interests. In particular, Shimbori Michiya traced this development 
and distinguished three different periods in the evolution of the Zengakuren: a first phase from 
1945 to 1947, characterized by “on-campus movements,” or, in other words, student movements 
born spontaneously in specific universities and confined to the one institution where they had 
generated; a second phase between 1948 and 1950 characterized by “co-campus” agitations, 
organized around a permanent and inter-campus institution; and finally a phase of “extra-campus” 
engagement during which students participated in demonstrations as citizens, and cooperated 
with other social movements.36 Such periodization not only stressed a transformation in terms of 
the movement’s shape and locus of activity; it also pointed out the maturation of the students’ 
concerns. While in the first phase students focused mostly on the democratization of their own 
university’s practices, in line with the policy of democratization of society promoted by the 
Occupation forces, starting in 1948 they began having to face common political problems on a 
national level.37 Around that time the General Headquarters of the Occupation forces had ordered 
an increase in university fees, the decentralization of national universities, and simultaneously the 
34 Kazuko Tsurumi, “The Japanese Student Movement (2) Group Portraits,” Japan Quarterly 16, no. 1 (January 1969): 
27-29. 
35 Ichiro Sunada, “The Thought and Behavior of Zengakuren: Trends in the Japanese Student Movement,” Asian 
Survey 9, no. 6 (June 1969): 457-474. 
36 Michiya Shimbori, “Comparison between Pre- and Post-War Student Movements in Japan:” 61-63. 
37 Ibid. 61. 
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purge of professors and university employees affiliated to the CPJ.38 It’s this situation that led to 
the formation of the Zengakuren as an organized and permanent institution for students’ inter-
campus collaboration on matters relevant to university life. It was then in the third of the periods 
defined by Shimbori that student activism took a purely political form, with the involvement of the 
Zengakuren in discussions of national political nature about foreign policy and security policy.39 
This third phase reached its apex in June 1960, with the organization of the demonstrations against 
the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.  
Hence it is possible to argue that, in the period of the rise and development of student 
activism, Japanese scholars tended to depict student movements as internally diverse and to 
render in their analyses the movements’ complexity, which developed horizontally through 
different factions, and vertically through time. However, already by the early 1970s an antithetical 
inclination appeared among scholars. As the involvement of students in civil society began to fade 
away, analysts started producing narratives that ripped student activism from its political value by 
ascribing the social unrest of the ‘60s and ‘70s predominantly to economic factors. According to 
one of these interpretations, for example, many college students joined the Zengakuren after 
becoming disillusioned with the post-war “middle-class dream,” as the increase in graduate 
students had produced a surplus of workers with higher education degrees, making it difficult for 
them to find jobs as white collars. 40 According to this interpretation, just as the increase of 
unemployed university graduates had pushed students toward active political opposition, the 
38 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat. Japan in the Wake of World War II (The New Press, 1999), 272. 
39 Michiya Shimbori, “Comparison between Pre- and Post-War Student Movements in Japan:” 63. 
40 Nick Sarkady, International Politics and the Left Wing Student Movement in Japan, 1952-1970 (Dissertation), 
(University of Utah, August 1970), 83- 84. 
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increasing consumerism of the late 1960s was to be accredited for the lessening of their 
involvement.41 
While it is impossible to exclude economic factors from an analysis of social movements, 
and similarly of student movements, in the following paragraphs I will argue that narratives that 
ascribe the social unrest of the 1960s predominantly to the economic situation of Japan in that 
period are the product of a particular political strategy devised by the then ruling political élite in 
order to surmount the political crisis they were facing.  
In contrast with the previous two decades, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by 
little to no engagement of Japanese people in civil society. This tendency can be understood as an 
expression of the feeling of impotence felt by citizens after the failure of the anti-Anpo 
demonstrations of June 1960, as the way in which the treaty renewal was achieved was felt to 
have been undemocratic and to signal the indifference of the ruling politicians to civil society’s 
demands.42 Similarly, these two decades were marked by a paucity of scholarship on the conflicts 
of the 1960s, and on social movements and student activism in general. The decreased interest in 
these topics was accompanied by the emergence of fixed topoi to describe them. These recurrent 
motifs can be assimilated to the “dominant narrative configurations” described by Ross:43 they 
had been extrapolated through strategies of “reduction” in order to construct an official story, and 
gradually crystalized as a narrative which had the effect of depoliticizing the activities of the 
Zengakuren and of the other social movements active in the 1960s. 
41 Ibid. 54-55. 
42 William Marotti, Money, Trains, and Guillotines. Art and Revolution in 1960s Japan (Duke University Press, 2013), 
134. 
43 Kristin Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives: 8. 
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Ross has shown how the “reduction,” or reframing of social activism, had happened in 
France on two main levels, first on a temporal level and then on a geographical level.44 The same 
can be said about Japan: on the one hand, an abbreviated history of social resistance was created 
through a “temporal reduction;” on the other, a “geographical reduction” limited the action of 
social movements to one geographical area. This second reduction also operated on a social level, 
limiting social activism to student activism, and thus negating the oppositional political power of 
other classes, as workers for instance, which had taken part in the 1960s’ struggles. In this way, 
social movements in Japan came to be identified with one particular instance of social mobilization, 
namely the student opposition that took place in the capital (and even more precisely, in front of 
the Diet building) in June 1960 against the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.  
Through these limitations, grassroots political opposition could be framed as a temporally 
determined and contingent issue, as a violent generational struggle rooted in cultural diversities, 
which however hadn’t had the power to altered major institutions. 45  The official story thus 
delegitimized the role of social activism, and particularly of student mobilizations, by negating 
their political nature, or in other words their being a “practice which disrupts this order [the social 
order] with reconfigurations of the social.”46 
To understand the hegemonic history about student movements in Japan it is necessary to 
retrace the process that led to the formulation of such narrative. After a decade of escalating 
protest actions, in the summer of 1960 the attempts of Prime Minister Kishi Nobosuke to pass 
44 Ibid. 8-9. 
45 Ibid. 21. 
46 William Marotti, Money, Trains, and Guillotines, 27. Marotti, like Ross, uses the concepts of politics and social 
order as defined by Rancière in Dis-agreement,  28- 33. 
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through the Diet a revised version of the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty were met with strong 
opposition from both the public and the opposition parties. Despite the parliamentary maneuvers 
of these latter (in particular of the Japan Socialist Party) and the public demonstrations outside 
the Diet building and the prime minister’s residence, the amendment was passed through the Diet 
and the treaty was revised.47 However, Prime Minister Kishi was forced to resign, and his party, 
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), had to set aside its agenda of rearmament and 
constitutional revision.  
Instead of addressing these controversial matters of foreign policy, the following 
government, led by Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, decided to focus on economic issues, proposing 
an “income-doubling plan” which was meant to double the income of Japanese families in a period 
of ten years. Thanks to the period of fast economic growth that Japan was going through at the 
time, Prime Minister Ikeda’s strategy succeeded in partly regaining the support of the electorate, 
but most importantly in shutting out the opposition of the Socialist and Communist parties, which 
based their campaigns on pacifism and social issues.48  
Although their anti-rearmament stance proved ineffective against the new economic focus 
of the LDP, and in spite of the dissatisfaction of the electorate with the political conduct of the 
ruling party, the two Left-wing opposition parties couldn’t reform their agendas in order to 
organize a coordinated opposition, thus failing to represent a valid political alternative to the LDP. 
Nevertheless, for the LDP to maintain dominance over the political scene it wouldn’t have been 
47 Ibid. 134. 
48 Steven R. Reed and Kay Shimizu, “An Overview of Postwar Japanese Politics,” in Political Change in Japan: 
Electoral Behavior, Party Realignment, and the Koizumi Reforms, ed. Steven R. Reed, Kenneth Mori McElwain and 
Kay Shimizu (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2009), 6. 
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enough to rely exclusively on the lack of a political alternative to its rule; the party had to shift to 
a “consensus- based policymaking system,” focused on internal unity and low-key policies which 
could gain support from the majority of the electorate and from the moderate ranks of the 
opposition.49 
To sum up, soon after the confrontations of June 1960 the political élite designed a strategy 
to face the crisis based on economic growth and welfare, in order to suppress opposition by 
delegitimizing the issues of contention such as constitutional revision and rearmament. As a 
consequence, contentious policies were made a political taboo, and at the same time the social 
unrest of the 1960s was recast as a product of economic instability, which would dissipate thanks 
to economic growth. Commentators in the 1980s and 1990s internalized this image of the struggle 
of the 1960s as a series of violent student protests, generated by the economic instability and 
social insecurity of the time. 
This political stratagem of the LDP of shifting the focus from politics of contestation to 
politics of consensus, from divisive security matters to favorable (or at least less contentious) 
economic policies, is still currently in use. In a way redolent of the strategy used by the LDP of 
Prime Minister Ikeda after the 1960s’ social struggles, Prime Minister Abe and his ministers have 
been campaigning for elections on their fiscal and economic policies, known as “Abenomics,” 
refraining from commenting upon defense issues and constitutional revision before elections.50 
Aware that the majority of voters oppose constitutional revision, as well as the country’s 
engagement in military activities, the Abe administration has been avoiding such matters, while 
49 Ibid. 7. 
50 Keigo Kawasaki, “LDP avoids touching on constitutional amendment ahead of election,” Mainichi Shimbun (6th 
June 2016). 
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emphasizing the importance of its economic policies. 51 Resorting to such strategy, the Prime 
Minister and his officials have managed to evade confrontations with the opposition; likewise, 
they have avoided officially recognizing social movements which campaign mostly on security 
issues as SEALDs as political threats. 52 
However, especially since the “Lost Decade” dissolved the impression of ever-growing 
economic wealth, scholars have started confronting this political dynamic and the hegemonic 
narrative about social movements that supports it. In 2001 Wesley Sasaki-Uemura recognized that 
the “Anpo struggle was the culmination of years of activity among groups trying to resist the state’s 
drive to restore prewar structures and create alternative visions for postwar democracy.”53 This 
definition not only restored the diversity of movements that joined the social contestations of the 
1960s, but it also reconstructed the struggles’ extended chronology by casting them as a process 
developing over time, with a pre-history and an aftermath, rather than as a singular moment in 
time, isolated from (and thus irrelevant to) the flux of historical events. Thereupon, Sasaki- 
Uemura argued that “limiting the scope of the analysis to the vortex that briefly engulfed the Diet 
and then rapidly subsided after the treaty went into effect obscures the submerged reality of the 
social movements that produced the vortex. It also obscures the connections that Anpo era 
movements had to the new waves of circles and social movements that followed.”54  
Lately scholars have tried to uncover some of these connections; for example, Carl 
Cassegård, in his studies on protest culture in Japan, has retraced the links between campus 
51 Ichiyo Muto, “Retaking Japan: The Abe Administrations’ Campaign to Overturn the Postwar Constitution,” The 
Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus 14, issue 13, no. 4 (July 2016): 1. 
52 Ichiyo Muto, “Retaking Japan:” 2. 
53 Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizens Protest in Post-War Japan (University of Hawaii 
Press, 2001), 3. 
54 Ibid. 196. 
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protests in the 1960s and the new precarity movements, or furītā movements, which have gained 
influence among youth since the burst of the financial bubble in the early 1990s.55 Unlike other 
scholars, who have focused on the differences between the old and the new youth movements in 
terms of structure and organization, ideology, and forms of protest, Cassegård has investigated 
how the legacy of the 1960s’ movements has influenced the new campus protests in terms of use 
of public space and performativity.56 Thus, he has shown that in order to deconstruct the main 
narrative about student movements in Japan it is necessary to break with the negative legacy that 
has been associated with protests and activism in Japan; in this way he has been able to restore a 
positive connection between the 1960s’ student mobilizations and contemporary youth activism. 
In the next chapter I will follow his example and compare the 1960s’ Zengakuren and 
SEALDs. I will show that despite the presence of voices of resistance to the hegemonic narrative 
about student activism in the academic field, such narrative is still dominating the public discourse, 
especially in social media and press outlets, creating a predominant perception of social activism 
that forces new movements, and in particular student movements, to define their action in 
opposition to the “negative legacy” of the 1960s and 1970s’ mobilizations. In contrast with this 
tendency, I will highlight some points of overlap between the old and the new student movements 
which are relevant to the evaluation of SEALDs’ political effectiveness. 
SEALDs and the 1960s’ Zengakuren: commonalities and differences 
As mentioned in the introduction, SEALDs evolved from the student movement known as 
SASPL (Students Against the Secret Protection Law). SASPL was founded in December 2013 by 
55 Cassegård Carl, “Lovable Anarchism: Campus Protest in Japan from the 1990s to Today,” Culture Unbound 6 
(2014): 361. 
56 Ibid. 365. 
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three university students; Okuda Aki, Ushida Yoshimasa, and Honma Nobukazu.57 The three of 
them were engaged in kantei-mae58 protests against the government’s State Secrecy Bills when 
they started reflecting on youth participation in social movements and in the public political 
debate. They acknowledged a lack of engagement, which they ascribed primarily to the scarce 
education in subjects as contemporary history and politics given by Japanese schools. Such 
“systemic avoidance of political issues by schools” led, and still leads, many high school and 
university students to regard politics and social problems as far from their everyday experiences 
and as irrelevant to their lives.59 
At first, Okuda and his fellow students decided to tackle this problem by organizing study 
groups whose pragmatic aim was that of clarifying the various political issues and narratives 
presented by news reports, in order to make them more understandable to youth and to expose 
their relevance for the Japanese society.60 Meanwhile they also started organizing demonstrations 
and activities against the State Secrecy Act in the Shibuya and Shinjuku wards of Tokyo.61  
Because its opposition was primarily directed against the Special Secrets Protection Bill, 
SASPL had been defined by analysts as a “single-issue campaign,” expected to dissolve after the 
State Secrecy Bills came into effect in December 2014.62 In fact, the group disbanded soon after 
the law came into force. However, by this time the core members had already recognized the need 
to re-define their movement in a wider and multi-focal form, adequate to their long-term mission 
57 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
58 Held in front of the Prime Minister’s official residence. 
59 Ayako Mie and Tomohiro Osaki, “Systemic avoidance of political issues by schools keeps youth vote in the dark,” 
The Japan Times (2nd May 2016). 
60 http://www.sealds.com/, section “Where we’re from.” 
61 Ibid. 
62 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy);” they give the term “campaign” the 
meaning defined by Charles Tilly in From Mobilization to Revolution (Addison-Wesley, 1978). 
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of battling for a more democratic political process in Japan.63 At the same time they managed to 
control the contrasting sentiments of defeat and impotence inside the group, and to frame the 
protests against the Secrecy Bills as just one aspect of their long-term battle for democracy.64 
The new configuration of the group took the name of SEALDs (Student Emergency Action 
for Liberal Democracy), and debuted on May 3, 2015, the Constitution Day.65 The initial group, 
formed by ex-SASPL members, was based in Tokyo and in the region around the capital. At this 
early stage the majority of members came from historically Christian universities as Meiji Gakuin, 
the International Christian University, Sophia University or Hosei University; however, many of 
them were not religiously affiliated to Christianity.66 From Tokyo, SEALDs quickly expanded to 
cover other regions, and now have branches in Okinawa, Tohoku and Tokai. The core members at 
present count around 400 people, to which a consistent number of non-member supporters 
participating regularly in the activities, such as demonstrations, study groups, and conferences, 
organized by the members must be added.67  
Currently, SEALDs organize study groups, talks and street demonstrations to promote what 
they define a “new political culture” (atarashii seiji bunka), or in other words political awareness, 
among the youth and help young people understand the roots and consequences of the policy 
choices made by the government.68 The concrete issues they focus on are diversified, from the 
63 http://www.sealds.com/, section “Where we’re from.” 
64 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
65 The choice of such date symbolically refers to the high value placed in the Constitution and in constitutional 
process by the group. 
66 Jeff Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on Japan’s Constitution.” Kingston discourages from focusing 
too much on the religious affinity of the universities attended by the first members, as it could be misleading to link 
their political activism to Christian ideals; on the contrary, he suggests that a feature common to these universities 
that may have influenced some students is their liberal left-wing orientation. 
67 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
68 http://www.sealds.com/, section “Suggestion.” 
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reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the implications of the U.S. - Japan 
security treaty, to the relocation of the Futenma U.S. military base to the village of Henoko and 
the popular opposition to the military presence of the U.S. in Okinawa. On their official site, they 
group these variety of interests under the three main categories of “constitutionalism,” “social 
security,” and “national security.”69  
More important than the specific issues, however, is the fact that SEALDs have identified 
an underlying main argument behind them, namely that the Abe government doesn’t respect the 
democratic principles represented by the Constitution, thus endangering the security and freedom 
of the Japanese people. Departing from this premise, SEALDs ask for respect of the law and of 
people’s rights, and for attention to the weak groups inside Japan.70 Furthermore, they try to 
sensitize young generations to the need for political participation of all citizens.71 
In so much as they focus directly on the government’s policies and because they frame 
their opposition as a fight for democracy and for a more democratic political process against a 
powerful political élite, SEALDs are similar to the Zengakuren of the 1960’s anti-Anpo struggle. Like 
their XX century forerunner, SEALDs use as a focus for their activism the political behavior of the 
government and Prime Minister, in particular regarding matters of defense. On a discursive level, 
SEALDs define Prime Minister Abe and his way of using power as “fascist,” and they resort 
extensively to comparisons between him and Hitler. Despite not being the only ones, nor the first 
ones, to make such a comparison,72 SEALDs’ direct criticism of the Prime Minister has attracted 
69 http://www.sealds.com/, section “Opinion.” 
70 SEALDs, “SEALDs one year anniversary,” post on SEALDs Eng, Facebook page (18th May 2016). 
71 Ibid. 
72 Comparisons between the Abe government and the National Socialist German Workers’ Party have been drawn 
by both members of the Abe cabinet and by critics. For example, in July 2013 the Deputy PM Asō Tarō suggested 
that the Japanese government should shape its process of constitutional amendment on the example of the Nazi 
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various attacks, in particular by reactionary online groups known as net uyoku.73 While it has been 
argued that many comparisons between the Abe administration and Hitler’s Nazi Party are based 
on a misreading of history,74 such parallels still hold value insomuch as they emphasize people’s 
responsibility in the political direction taken by their government.75 Thus it is significant that 
SEALDs, in opposition to Abe’s “fascist” ways, uphold “democracy,” and respect for the political 
voice of citizens.  
The direct focus on the political behavior and policies of the government is also an 
important aspect of SEALDs because it reveals the sophisticated understanding of social activism 
the group has achieved. While Abe’s proactive political actions have thrown many activists in a 
state of despair over the possibility to really affect politics through social mobilization, they have 
worked as a “political opportunity” for SEALDs.76 In other words, the group has taken advantage 
of the disapproval felt by the majority of the population toward Abe’s political conduct and given 
an alternative reading of the various reforms he has been pushing for. For example, while news 
reports on TV and print supportive of Abe have framed the recent reinterpretation of Article 9 of 
the Japanese Constitution as a way to allow more room for the peace-keeping operations and 
disaster relief missions in which the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) have been involved in 
party’s process of replacement of the Weimar Constitution. Ichiyo Muto, “Retaking Japan:” 4. On the critics’ side, 
the editorial written in February 2016 by Ikeda Hiroshi, professor at Kyoto University, for the Tokyo Shimbun is 
representative insomuch as it delineates the aspects of the Abe administration that are reminiscent of Hitler’s rise 
to power. Hiroshi Ikeda, “Hitler’s dismantling of the Constitution and the Current Path of Japan’s Abe 
Administration: What Lessons Can We Draw from History?” The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus 14, issue 13, no. 4 
(July 2016): 1. 
73 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
74 Ichiyo Muto, “Retaking Japan:” 5. 
75 Hiroshi Ikeda, “Hitler’s dismantling of the Constitution and the Current Path of Japan’s Abe Administration:” 7. 
76 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
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order to render it more acceptable to public opinion, 77  SEALDs have exposed its military 
implications.  
Nevertheless, the group has tended to reduce those implications to an over-simplified 
concept of war that it then associates with the U.S.-Japan alliance and constructs as a “fight for 
American geopolitical ambitions.”78 The simplification makes it easier for young people raised with 
the “peaceful country” ideal to empathize with SEALDs’ stance; at the same time, it creates an 
“emergency,” personified in a concrete enemy, which gives unity to the group and lends urgency 
to its actions.79 In addition, the direct reference to the Prime Minister, done in public by young 
college students who look completely regular and wouldn’t normally be expected to actively 
engage in politics has come as a shock to many Japanese older citizens, provoking an emotional 
response in people; 80 from such strong emotions indignation and a sense of emergency and 
relevance have burgeoned, which have led to popular mobilization.81 
Thus, SEALDs have managed to create a sense of individual responsibility, by shifting the 
focus of their activities back and forth between the political issues they discuss and the ability of 
public opinion and civil opposition to affect them. For instance, SEALDs have extensively used the 
slogan “War is over,” hinting at the famous song by John Lennon, whose chorus is “war is over/if 
you want it.” Through the association between the slogan and the song a second association 
77 Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese public opinion and security: From pacifism to realism? (Stanford University 
Press, 2011), 39. 
78 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).”  
79 Ibid. Slater and his colleagues reproduce an argument common to most social movement theories, according to 
which a concrete enemy and urgency of action are two necessary elements for successful activism, as they construct 
a sense of opposition and a problem whose solution can’t be postponed. 
80 Naomi Gingold, “The student group in Japan that's made it cool to protest,” PRI’s The World (27th May 2016). 
81 Randall Collins, “Stratification, Emotional Energy, and the Transient Emotions,” in Research Agendas in the 
Sociology of Emotions, ed. Theodor D. Kemper (State University of New York Press, 1990), 28. 
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between the end of wars and personal commitment takes shape. Similarly, in preparation to the 
Upper House elections of the 10th of July 2016, SEALDs have launched the online campaign 
#donttrashyourvote, which aims at increasing voter turnout in the elections by stressing the 
importance of every single vote. 
Critiques to the group’s emotional strategies haven’t lacked.82 Older activists in particular 
have recognized the danger of focusing on the figure of Abe, who is only the current 
representative of a system, rather than on the system itself. Moreover, this strategy could become 
counterproductive because it resorts to strong, irrational emotions that could go out of control, 
thus nullifying the efforts made by the group to create a non-violent “normal” image of student 
activism (of which more later). Similarly, the focus on Abe relegates to the background the 
historical process that has led to the current situation, reinforcing the critiques about the naivety 
and superficiality of the group members. 
Slater has contested these critiques arguing that the core members of the group are aware 
of the larger systemic failure and actually address it in their website and in print materials, while 
in street manifestations they try to elicit more spontaneous reactions by directing the emotional 
disagreement of the participants to a single individual.83 He also maintains that taking Abe as a 
focal target allows SEALDs to avoid a radical systemic critique of the State and of its economic, 
social and political structures, while condemning the extreme position of the current Prime 
Minister, which is an attitude more acceptable to the mass of Japanese people. Such a moderate 
posture has positively influenced the popularity of SEALDs; however, the reliance on emotional 
82 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
83 Ibid. 
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responses from the public exposes the group to the shifting nature of the public’s support. In other 
words, if the proactive stance of Prime Minister Abe and of his political faction will last enough to 
affect the security identity of the Japanese people, or if security threats will appear that justify an 
assertive defense posture, the danger is that SEALDs’ focus on the non-democratic process 
through which security policies have been enacted will become alien to or irrelevant for the 
majority of the population.  
Beside the direct focus on government’s policies, SEALDs and the 1960s’ Zengakuren also 
share another characteristic: both groups show internal diversity in terms of ideology and political 
leaning of their members. As Tsurumi argued, inside the Zengakuren several different approaches 
to political theories coexisted, making the members of the group share more an “ideological 
posture” than a single political ideology.84 Similarly, SEALDs have refused to affiliate with political 
parties, allowing a wider range of people to join their activities without having to subscribe to a 
definite political ideology.  
In spite of their refusal to choose a political side, SEALDs have collaborated with the old 
Left-wing protesters, now united in the nationwide Sōgakari union, in order to organize 
complementary protests when their interests overlapped;85 similarly, in several occasions the 
group has invited representatives of the Japanese Left to speak with them against the current 
government, 86 or has been present at political events organized by the opposition.87 However, 
these activities don’t seem to aim at aligning with any of the different agendas inside the 
84 Tsurumi, “The Japanese Student Movement (1) its Milieu:” 445- 446. 
85 Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on Japan’s Constitution.” 
86  For example, in the debate held on June 27th 2015 at Shibuya’s Hachiko, SEALDs invited exponents of the 
Communist Party of Japan and the former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)’s Prime Minister Kan Naoto. 
87 For instance, SEALDs’ founder Okuda Aki was present at the launch of the new opposition party Minshintō.  
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opposition, or to mean an acceptance of ideological positions; rather, they seems to represent 
attempts at dialogue. 88 The formation of the civil society umbrella group Shimin rengō (Civil 
Alliance for Peace and Constitutionalism) in December 2015 proves that these attempts have so 
far proven beneficial as they have helped overcome the traditional divisions inside the Japanese 
civil opposition.89  
Thus, if on the one hand internal diversity meant for the Zengakuren of the 1960s and ‘70s 
division and the eventual collapse of the organization, on the other it appears to have been used 
as an opportunity to gain wider support by SEALDs. Because of their non-partisan position, SEALDs 
have appealed to a large variety of people, and their manifestations have been joined by old 
activists in their 70s-80s, mothers’ associations, anti-nuclear activists, citizens unsatisfied with the 
current political situation, students form Zengakuren, and Christian groups alike.90 Furthermore, 
from SEALDs many subgroups have sprouted: OLDs, for supporters in their 50s-60s; MIDDLEs, for 
those in their 30s-40s; and even a section for high-school students.91 They all support the actions 
of SEALDs because they agree that Abe’s political conduct and his pushing in the Diet his proactive 
military stance are anti-constitutional and objectionable. Likewise, other students in their early 
20s have been encouraged to establish their own politically engaged social groups following the 
example of SEALDs.92 
88 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
89 The alliance unites five social movements, namely Sōgakari, the Association of Scholars Opposed to the Security-
related Bills, the Association for Constitutional Democracy, Mothers Against War (Association of Mothers Against 
the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty), and SEALDs. http://shiminrengo.com/yobikake.  
90 Kakuchi Suvendriki, “Student movement builds a broader political platform,” University World News 431 (13th May 
2016). 
91 Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on Japan’s Constitution.” 
92 For example, in 2014 the university student Hirokatsu Goto (21) founded the NPO “Let’s change Japan a step at a 
time” 「僕らの一歩が日本を変える。」, whose mission is “to connect young people with politics in new ways”
「若者と政治に新しい出会いを届ける。」. http://boku1.org/about/.  
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In spite of the aforementioned similarities in terms of interests and internal heterogeneity, 
SEALDs have been focused on casting an image of themselves and of their activism as antithetically 
opposite to the student movements of 1960s and ‘70s. In particular, they have put much effort in 
creating a friendly and non-violent image of themselves in the media and in the eyes of public 
opinion. Likewise, the group has had to fight the assumption, widespread among Japanese youth, 
that street manifestations in their country are illegal, as they threaten the peaceful livelihood of 
the people.93  
To overcome this assumption, SEALDs have had to shape their image and their message in 
a way that is appealing to young students, making extensive use of social media and youth culture 
to promote their activities; besides, they’ve had to carefully design their manifestations in order 
to control their image to the general public. They have avoided violent, threatening actions that 
would have been associated with the dominant negative image of student activism, and which 
would have alienated them from the public, favoring instead an image of “normality.” They have 
rejected every form of radicalism, be it conservative or progressive, and the kind of extreme 
actions as violent protests and hunger strikes performed in the 1960s and ‘70s by student 
movements, recognizing that such actions would have played against them, giving to the 
conservative government a chance to reinforce the existing image of student activism as 
threatening and thus to undermine their public support.94  
Thus an image of SEALDs as contemporary, easy-going, fashion-conscious regular students 
has come to prevail on the group’s official online pages and in the media. As a consequence of the 
93 Naomi Gingold, “The student group in Japan that's made it cool to protest.” 
94 Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on Japan’s Constitution.” 
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great emphasis which has been given to the appearance of the members and to the design of their 
print products and social media profiles, SEALDs have been criticized for not being serious enough, 
and for focusing on “style over substance.”95 Some critics have gone as far as to suggest that the 
real strength of SEALDs is not their ideas (which wouldn’t be many anyway, according to the same 
critics), but rather their female members, who act as music idols and have thus gathered media 
attention for the rest of the group.96 According to the founder and core member of SEALDs Okuda 
Aki these criticisms are inconsistent, as it has been the strategy of his group from the beginning to 
use channels of communication familiar to young people, such as magazines, social media and 
music events, to cast an image of the members as normal, and of their political activities as 
consistent with a regular student’s everyday life. 97  Furthermore, it is evident from SEALDs’ 
activities that women have an active role inside the group, other than lending their faces for 
representational ends. The active engagement of female citizens as core members inside SEALDs 
represents a divergence from other social movements. Even all-women anti-nuclear power 
mothers’ associations base their activism on an ideal role of women which stems from a 
patriarchal system of gendered division of labor, thus not undermining such system;98 instead, 
SEALDs female members promote the emancipation of  women from gendered roles.  
To sum up, being tech-savvy and media-aware, SEALDs “are just applying the on-line 
practices of their personal lives to political ends”99 and by doing so they have effectively managed 
95 Naomi Gingold, “The student group in Japan that's made it cool to protest.” 
96 William Andrews, “About My Liberty: SEALDs 2015 Documentary Film about Student Activist Released in May,” 
Throw Out Your Books (blog) (10th April 2016). 
97 Naomi Gingold, “The student group in Japan that's made it cool to protest.” 
98 Kathleen Uno, “The Death of the ‘Good Wife, Wise Mother’?” in Postwar Japan as History, ed. Andrew Gordon 
(University of California Press, 1993), 293-322. 
99 Tom Gill, anthropologist, cited by Kingston in “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on Japan’s Constitution.” 
28 
 
                                                            
to reject the stereotypical representations associated with violent student activism and with 
extreme Left-wing social movements. At the same time, instead of using social media as a diversion 
from real life, SEALDs have used their technological shrewdness to reach out to a wider public, to 
captivate young citizens, and to connect people who share their same political and social concerns 
but who are geographically distant. In this way, SEALDs have been actively defying the stereotypes 
surrounding young university students in Japan, refusing to be passive spectators of policymaking, 
retreated in a virtual world of leisure and amusement.100 Combining these two different aspect, 
the group has managed to create a socially acceptable image of itself, which has proved to be 
decisive for the success of SEALDs’ political advocacy, insofar as it has helped the group reach a 
wider public and gain its support and approval. 
Street demonstrations have also played an important role in constructing the visual 
identity of SEALDs. The group has shaped its demonstrations as a space for encounter between 
pairs, where critical thinking and individuality are praised, creating a contrasting environment in 
comparison with the Japanese school system, which leaves little space for autonomous expression. 
Likewise, SEALDs have framed their manifestations as a chance to create ties with other young 
people with similar interests even for those who still don’t feel at ease showing to classmates, 
friends and families their political concern, and thus don’t publicize it through social media.101  
From this perspective, street demonstrations are a safe way to join the opposition while 
maintaining a relatively low profile and anonymity, if compared with reposting and sharing on 
social media.  
100 Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on Japan’s Constitution;” and Hifumi Okonuki, “Should SEALDs 
student activists worry about not getting hired?” The Japan Times (Aug. 30th 2015). 
101 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
29 
 
                                                            
SEALDs’ coordinated use of both online and offline activities has been carefully managed 
by the group, and has ultimately proven effective in “mainstreaming political activism and making 
it seem unthreatening to the public.”102 As Slater and his research group have already argued, the 
effectiveness of SEALDs’ activities depends on the conscious use of two specific kinds of framing 
strategies to construct issues as relevant to members and to influence public opinion: on the one 
hand, “cognitive or ideological frames,” such as manifestos and websites’ pages, are used to 
explicitly illustrate the relevance of the issues addressed and the potential effects of common 
action; on the other hand, “emotional frames,” which are visual, instinctive appeals delivered 
through demonstrations and social media, are used to foster awareness of the issues addressed 
in the protests and connect them in a coherent fight against non-democratic, exclusive 
policymaking.103  
Besides using social media and demonstrations to document their normality, SEALDs have 
also carefully managed their public image by collaborating with the traditional media (TV and print 
press) through interviews, press conferences and events.104 In its official communications, the 
group stresses the ordinariness, politeness and education of its members to give out a reassuring 
image. Furthermore, SEALDs have been consciously aiming at the international press, as the 
English acronym they have selected as a name, and the presence of an official English-language 
Facebook page imply.  
To sum up, there exist points of overlap between SEALDs and the 1960s’ Zengakuren, 
namely the direct focus on government’s policies and the internal heterogeneity of the two groups. 
102 Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on Japan’s Constitution.” 
103 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
104 Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on Japan’s Constitution.” 
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However, scholars have only briefly touched upon these commonalities, and in the media they are 
largely overlooked. Consequently, SEALDs are usually confronted not with the Zengakuren of the 
1960s and ‘70s but with a stereotyped negative image of student activism. As a result, the 
assessments of SEALDs produced by the press and the media have been limited to their visual 
strategies and their image, which are the aspects of the group which contrast with the 
predominant image of student activism as a violent and anti-social kind of social mobilization; 
furthermore, the hegemonic narrative about social movements that depicts student activism as a 
violent anti-systemic activity has been perpetuated.  
SEALDs in the context of contemporary Japanese civil society 
In the broader political context of Japan, SEALDs position themselves as “liberal” 
opposition, whose principal aim is to create a “new political culture” which would lead to the birth 
of an effective political opposition able to resist the ruling LDP’s tendency to “impose” legislations 
by forcing them through the Diet, in complete disregard of public opinion. Such an opposition 
would then support the establishment or the conservation of friendly and peaceful relations with 
the countries surrounding Japan, and promote equality and shared growth inside the country.  
It is evident from their political goals that SEALDs don’t aim at challenging the the post-war 
Japanese system and identity, but rather at restoring the fundamental ideals behind them. For 
example, their pacifist approach to national security, which reflects “Japan’s long-standing identity 
of domestic antimilitarism,”105 is more representative of the position held by Japan since the end 
of the Occupation than Prime Minister Abe’s pro-active defence stance is.  
105 Andrew L. Oros, “International and domestic challenges to Japan's postwar security identity: ‘norm 
constructivism’ and Japan's new ‘proactive pacifism,” The Pacific Review 28, no. 1 (2015): 140. 
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Nevertheless, SEALDs’ attitude is not one of anachronistic opposition to change, but one 
of contingent opposition to the direction of current changes. For instance, SEALDs don’t oppose 
all modifications of the Japanese Constitution, but only those revisions that don’t respect the due 
process and are not in line with public opinion. From the group’s perspective, the Constitution 
could be changed to give equal rights to sexual minorities, which are increasingly accepted in Japan, 
as a legal change would accelerate the process of inclusion; however, the Constitution shouldn’t 
be changed to allow Japan to move toward a military proactive behaviour, as the majority of the 
population still embraces a pacifist stance.106 Likewise, SEALDs oppose the pushing through the 
Diet of legislations which effectively amount to revisions of the Constitution without formally and 
legally being, and which are opposed by public opinion (as for example the new interpretation of 
Article 9 of the Constitution which was rammed through the Diet on the 19th of September 
2015).107 
SEALDs’ rejection of anti-systemic notions puts the group in a position of contrast with 
furītā movements, or precarity workers’ movements.108 Furītā is a Japanese neologism created 
from the English word “free” and the German word “arbeiter” (worker); it came into common use 
in the early 1990s, after the burst of the economic bubble, to describe “young people who are not 
regularly employed but who work at one or more part-time jobs or at one short-term job after 
another.”109 SEALDs and furītā movements address similar social issues, such as job insecurity and 
the lack of an extended welfare security system in Japan. These shared social preoccupations have 
106 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
107 Ichiyo Muto, “Retaking Japan:” 1. 
108 O’Day, “Differentiating SEALDs from Freeters, and Precariats.” 
109 Yūji Genda, A Nagging Sense of Job Insecurity. The New Reality Facing Japanese Youth (International House of 
Japan Press, 2005), 52.  
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until now created a common ground of discussion between the two movements; however, they 
have also increasingly come to represent points of disagreement because of the divergent 
solutions sought to them by SEALDs and furītā. Furītā movements demand progressive changes in 
the socio-economic structure of Japan, and in the legal framework that allows the exploitation of 
occasional workers. 110  In contrast, SEALDs focus on the protection of the liberal democratic 
aspects of the socio-political system of Japan, which they think have been endangered by the 
political behavior of the Abe cabinet. Thus, while furītā call for a reappraisal of the post-war 
Japanese State system, SEALDs advocate a return to a moderate form of that system, and reject 
only the extreme stance represented by Abe and its government. 111  Furthermore, the 
identification of SEALDs with the political Left represents more a reaction to the increasing Right-
wing penchant of the LDP than the expression of a wish for communist or anarchical revolution.112 
This divergence between the two groups could be seen as a consequence of the difference 
in terms of social status and social capital of their membership, as furītā movements, whose 
members are occasional workers and students or new graduates who refuse (or in some cases are 
unable) to enter lifetime employment, appeal to marginalized individuals who have failed to 
integrate in social conformity, 113  while most of SEALDs’ core members come from top-rank 
universities and don’t consider subverting social order. On the contrary, they talk overtly of 
110 Gordon Mathews, “Seeking a Career, Finding a Job: How Young People Enter and Resist the Japanese World of 
Work,” in Japan’s Changing Generations, ed. Gordon Mathews and Bruce White (Routledge Curzon, 2004), 122. 
111 O’Day, “Differentiating SEALDs from Freeters, and Precariats;” Ogawa Akihiro, Professor of Japanese Studies at 
the University of Melbourne, voices the same opinion (cited in Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on 
Japan’s Constitution”). 
112 Tom Gill, anthropologist at Meiji Gakuin, cited in Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on Japan’s 
Constitution.” 
113 Gordon Mathews, “Seeking a Career, Finding a Job,” 131. 
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entering the mainstream society after graduation, and of promoting a wider political participation 
by involving in civil society “normal” people.  
The attitude of SEALDs toward social and political change has been criticized by some 
members of furītā movements, who regard SEALDs as “rich kids playing at politics.”114 Scholars 
who have had the possibility to closely follow SEALDs’ activities have opposed this assessment. In 
particular, O’Day has argued that SEALDs’ core members are aware of their position of privilege in 
society and seek to use their advantage constructively.115 Similarly, Kingston has suggested that 
SEALDs use the relative freedom given by their status as university students and their education 
to engage with the political debate and with social problems instead than opting for diversions 
such as sport clubs and other amusements that prevail among their pairs.116  
Nevertheless, because SEALDs haven’t shown an interest in radical social change their 
social advocacy has little meaning for those people who can’t integrate in the contemporary 
Japanese mainstream society. However, the moderate stance they promote contrasts the existing 
tendencies of engaging with politics completely in a radical way or not engaging with it at all, 
showing that it’s possible to be part of civil society and have a political identity for regular 
people.117 In other words, SEALDs’ position represents a middle-of-the-road alternative which 
appeals to the social strata which have until now been politically disengaged, without necessarily 
being satisfied with the socio-political situation of the country. From this perspective, the 
114 O’Day, “Differentiating SEALDs from Freeters, and Precariats.” 
115 Ibid. His opinion is supported by interviews he conducted during fieldwork at the group’s manifestations. 
116 Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on Japan’s Constitution.” 
117 O’Day, “Differentiating SEALDs from Freeters, and Precariats.” 
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moderate stance of SEALDs on social issues represents the best choice to achieve the ultimate 
goal of the group of making political participation “a new norm in Japan.”118 
Besides furītā movements, SEALDs are also closely linked to anti-nuclear movements. For 
many core members of SEALDs, and for many young Japanese activists in general, the nuclear 
disaster that stroke the Eastern shore of Japan in March 2011 represented an important turning 
point and the beginning of their political awakening; for this reason, the anti-nukes component is 
very strong inside SEALDs.119 Moreover, SEALDs are indebted to anti-nukes protests for a more 
concrete reason. Since after the 3.11 triple disaster, a wide variety of people has joined anti-
nuclear movements in weekly gatherings that take place in front of the Diet Building and the Prime 
Minister’s official residence to protest against reliance on nuclear power and for the right to live 
in a radiation-free environment.120 To this day, protesters still meet every Friday evening in front 
of the Prime Minister’s official residence and in front of the Diet.121 The regularity of anti-nuke 
protests has contributed to normalize political demonstrations in the eyes of the population, at 
first in the capital and subsequently in most major cities; at the same time, the participation of 
mothers’ associations, fishers’ and farmers’ unions, and of groups of evacuated families next to 
long-time activists has helped dissipating the assumption of violence and extremism surrounding 
demonstrators.122 SEALDs have benefitted from this situation, and have further promoted the 
participation in street demonstrations of normal citizens, especially young ones. 
118 Nakano Koichi, Sophia University (cited in Kingston, “SEALDs: Students Slam Abe’s Assault on Japan’s 
Constitution”). 
119 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
120 Eiji Oguma, “A New Wave Against the Rock: New social movements in Japan since the Fukushima nuclear 
meltdown,” The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus 14, issue 13, no. 1 (July 2016): 1. 
121 Tetsuya Hyoka, “Kantei ya kokkai mae de ‘Saikado hantai’ 6000 nin (官邸や国会前で「再稼働反対」６０００
人),” Mainichi Shimbun (11th March 2016). 
122 Slater et al., “SEALDs (Student Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy).” 
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The Japanese media have had an important role in the normalization of street protests, as 
after 3.11 newspapers and TV reports started to describe activists as “normal” (futsū), abandoning 
terms as “extreme” or “inappropriate,” which were previously used to describe social movements, 
thus legitimizing the idea of joining a street demonstration in the mind of (young) citizens. Many 
examples can be found in Japanese newspapers, especially in the liberal Asahi Shimbun, of articles 
reporting demonstrations which include brief interviews with the participants. In these articles 
demonstrators are represented as regular people, and mostly talk about how their political 
engagement fits in their daily lives and has influenced their future goals. 123 
However, in spite of the fact that demonstrations by both anti-nuclear movements and 
SEALDs have been attended by hundreds of thousands of people, many of the groups’ activities 
haven’t been reported by the mass media.124 With the mass media increasingly under the control 
of the ruling LDP,125 social media and the internet have progressively gained importance in the 
mainstreaming of social activism. On the one hand, it has been shown that the use of online social 
media effectively influences the recruitment of members and demonstrators,126 helps connecting 
otherwise isolated people who aren’t conscious of the potential of common actions, 127 and is 
useful in generating political interest in citizens who were previously uninterested.128 On the other 
123 Goto Ryota and Miako Ichikawa, “Koe wo ageugokasu- saki wo misueru Anpo hantai no wakamonora”(「声を上
げ動かす」先を見据える反保反対の若者ら), Asahi Shinbun (Dec. 6th 2015) is an example of such an article, 
where SEALDs’ members express their wish to become part of the Japanese society in an ordinary way, and at the 
same time to participate actively in the national political debate. 
124 Eiji Oguma, “A New Wave Against the Rock:” 14. 
125 Anonym. “Speak no Evil: Japan’s media are quailing under government pressure,” The Economist (16th May 
2016). 
126 Bernard Enjolras, Kari Steen-Johnsen, and Dag Wollebæk, “Social Media and Mobilization to Offline 
Demonstrations: Transcending Participatory Divides?” New Media & Society, 15, no. 6 (2012): 904. 
127 Rebecca A. Hayes, New Media, New Politics: Political Learning Efficacy and the Examination of Uses of Social 
Network Sites for Political Engagement (Michigan State University, 2009), 6. 
128 Sanne Kruikemeier et al., “Unraveling the effects of active and passive forms of political Internet use: Does it 
affect citizens’ political involvement?” New Media and Society, 16, no. 6 (2014): 915. 
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hand, however, online networks have a major weak point, namely that they can only connect 
individuals who already have something in common.129 Thus, SNS need to be combined with other 
methods such as direct offline personal relationships to be effective in mobilizing citizens.130  
SEALDs appear to have successfully coordinated their online and offline activities, and to 
have been able to take advantage of their connections with other social movements to enlarge 
their support basis, rather than let the different component of their activism, such as the anti-
nuke component, tie them down to a single issue. 
Conclusions  
In one year of activity SEALDs have become the first student movement since the 1960s’ 
Zengakuren to attract substantial civil support and media attention. They have managed to 
positively cope with the hegemonic image of student activism as a violent and anti-systemic form 
of political participation, defying the predominant narrative about social movements in Japan, as 
well as stereotypes regarding youth’s political disengagement. Similarly, they have gained support 
by a variety of citizens and by a wide range of other social movements, creating a cooperative 
social opposition to the ruling LDP and Prime Minister Abe Shinzō.  
Nevertheless, the results of the House of Councillors elections of July 10th 2016 indicate 
that they have failed to achieve their final goal of increasing Japanese civil society’s political 
engagement. In the elections, the LDP, together with its coalition partner Kōmeitō and other 
smaller parties and independents supportive of constitutional amendment have secured the two-
129 Eiji Oguma, “A New Wave Against the Rock:” 16. 
130 Ibid. 17. 
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thirds of seats in the Upper House necessary to start the process of revision.131 Furthermore, the 
voter turnout in the elections increased only of a 2.09 percentage point in comparison with the 
previous Upper House elections of 2009;132 the increase could represent a small growth in citizens’ 
political engagement, but could also be a result of the lowering of voting age from 20 to 18 years 
old which has been introduced in the elections.133 
In addition, a survey conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun on the 10th of July shows that 
besides failing to increase electoral attendance, SEALDs and the opposition parties have also been 
unable to frame the elections as a battle over constitutional amendment, while the LDP’s strategy 
to focus on economic and welfare policies has once again proven fruitful.134 Thus SEALDs, in spite 
of their promising features, have not been able to alter the predominant voting behaviour of 
Japanese citizens, who have tended to place less emphasis on security issues when deciding how 
to vote compared with issues related to the economy and to social security.135 
In conclusion, SEALDs have reacted to the failure of their political struggle with a joint 
communique published on the site of the civil alliance Shimin rengō and on their Facebook official 
page. The message focuses primarily on the achievements of the opposition in terms of 
representatives elected, which are attributed to the cooperation between various social 
131 Yoso Furumoto, “Kaiken Seiryoku Sanbun no ni kosu. Jikō, Kaisen Kahansu” (「改憲勢力３分の２超す 自公、
改選過半数」), Mainichi Shimbun (11th July 2016). 
132 Kei Satō, “Tōyōritsu bizō 54.70%. Kako yon banme no Hikui” (「投票率微増５４．７０％ 過去４番目の低
さ」), Mainichi Shimbun (11th July 2016). 
133  At the time of writing no data on this subject was available yet. 
134 Keigo Kawasaki and Yamasaki Katsuyuki, “Kenpō, Keizai de kakusare. Sanbun no ni ‘Shirazu’ tasū. Yūkensha 150 
nin kiku” (「憲法、経済で隠され ３分の２「知らず」多数 有権者１５０人に聞く」), Mainichi Shimbun 
(11th July 2016.) 
135 Eiji Oguma, ““A New Wave Against the Rock:” 21. 
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movements and the opposition parties.136 From another message published on SEALDs’ official 
website also seems possible that SEALDs, in spite of their decision to disband after the elections, 
may be considering furthering their political engagement. 137  It also appears that the core 
members of the group have already recognized the need to improve collaboration among the 
opposition parties, and to promote dialogue between these parties and citizens, as one of long-
term reasons behind the LDP political success is the lack of a rooted and stable political alternative. 
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